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BLACK WOMEN AND THE CONSTITUTION:
FINDING OUR PLACE, ASSERTING OUR RIGHTS
Judy Scales-Trent*
I woke up this morning, I could see
and I could breathe
Are there any rights I'm entitled to?'
Introduction
The economic, political, and social situation of black
women in America is bad, and has been bad for a long time.
Historically, they have borne both the disabilities of blacks and
the disabilities which inhere in their status as women. These
two statuses have often combined in ways which are not only
additive, but synergistic-that is, they create a condition for
black women which is more terrible than the sum of their two
constituent parts. 2 The result is that black women are the lowest
paid group in America today when compared to white women,
black men or white men. They also face significantly higher
unemployment rates than any of those groups. The poverty rates
for black women, even controlling for age and education, are
higher than the poverty rates for white women and black men.
By the beginning of this decade seventy percent of all poor
black families were supported by black women. 3 Not surpris-
ingly, studies have shown that when compared to whites and
* Associate Professor of Law and Jurisprudence, S.U.N.Y. Buffalo School of Law.
I am indebted to the many colleagues who read earlier drafts of this Article and
offered encouragement, suggestions and hard questions. Among that group, special
thanks go to Isabelle Marcus, Bob Belton, and Betty Mensch. My appreciation also
goes to Colleen Blair for her excellent research assistance.
IB. Reagon, "Are There Any Rights I'm Entitled To?" in Sweet Honey in the Rock
(Flying Fish Music, BMI 1976).
2 See Almquist, Untangling the Effects of Race and Sex: The Disadvantaged Status
of Black Women, 55 Soc. Sci. Q. 129, 135-36 (1975). Almquist demonstrates that the
sum of the racial gap in umemployment rates (comparing unemployment rates of white
and black men) plus the sexual gap (comparing same rates of white and black women),
is not as great as the racial-sexual gap (comparing rates of white men and black women).
This suggests that race and sex interact to magnify the effect of each independently.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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black men, black women lack an overall sense of well-being and
satisfaction, while posessing a strong sense of powerlessness
and lack of control over their lives .4
Despite, or perhaps because of, this dual disability and its
negative effects on life opportunities for black women, the prob-
lems of black women often go unrecognized. Black women have
not been seen as a discrete group with a unique history, unique
strengths and unique disabilities. By creating two separate cat-
egories for its major social problems--"the race problem," and
"the women's issue"-society has ignored the group which
stands at the interstices of these two groups, black women in
America.' For example, social reformist discussion tends to
focus on the need to protect "minorities and women" from the
hardships of discrimination. Although this term is intended to
be inclusive, in fact, it misleads by overlooking those Americans
who are both "minorities" and "women." A more accurate ap-
proach would be to use terms such as "male minorities and
women," or "minorities and white women." These phrases ac-
knowledge that other groups, including black women, do exist
and that their problems can be addressed separately.
The legal system has incorpiiated the same dichotomous
systemn-"minorities" and "women"-into its way of analyzing
problems. Thus, the legal system, which is trying to protect the
rights of "blacks" and "women," when faced with the existence
of "black women," sometimes has difficulty categorizing this
group. 6 For example, during the debates over the employment
discrimination provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, legislators
discussed whether or not to add a prohibition against sex dis-
crimination to the bill. Since the bill clearly would prohibit
discrimination in employment based on race, there was some
confusion and disagreement as to whether black women were
going to be treated as blacks or as women for the purposes of
4 See ittfra text accompanying notes 54-55.
W.E.B. DuBois alluded to this dual identity in recounting the following conver-
sation: "Wait till the lady passes," said a Nashville white boy. "She's no lady; she's a
nigger," answered another. W.E.B. DuBois, Darkwater: Voices from Within the Veil
185 (1920).
6 Cf. Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 70 (1987)
(Chinese labeled "Indian" by 19th-century California authorities to fit them within
recognized legal framework).
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obtaining the protection of the statute. During the House de-
bates, Rep. Griffiths, a white woman, expressed her concern
that black women would be protected by the Act based on their
race, whereas white women would have no protection unless
sex were added as a prohibited basis of discrimination. She
stated: "[I]f you do not add sex to this bill ... you are going to
try to take colored men and colored women and give them equal
employment rights, and down at the bottom of the list is going
to be a white woman with no rights at all."'7 Rep. Celler, a white
man, tried to clarify the issue by noting that black women would
be protected only on the basis of race, not sex. He explained,
"if the Negress who applied for the job was disqualified because
of the pigmentation of her skin, because she was colored, the
act would apply."'8 The consensus was, however, that this dis-
tinction would not hold up in real employment situations. 9 The
clear distinctions the legislators wanted to make between race
and sex discrimination became unclear once black women had
to be categorized.
Although the legal system has a framework for analyzing
legal issues involving black Americans, and a framework for
analyzing legal issues involving American women, the system
is not clear on how to analyze issues involving black American
women-standing, as they do, with a foot in each camp. This
Article discusses how the Constitution defines and protects
black women. It then explores how black women should be
defined by the Constitution-as women, as blacks, or as a dis-
tinct group with a legal identity of its own.
The first section of this Article discusses how a new group,
with new status-black women-is formed by the combination
of multiple statuses in society. This section also addresses hiW
the definitions of a group, within the legal systbi'm and within
the larger society, interact and reinforce each 6ther. It then
7 E.E.O.C., Legislative History of Title VII and IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
at 3218 (1968). Rep. Smith of Virginia offered the "sex" amendment to Title VII in an
effort to defeat the bill, which extended equal employment opportunity to blacks. Rep.
Griffiths' view, stated above, was strongly supported in debate by Rep. Smith, as well
as by other white male representatives from the South, Rep. Andrews (Alabama), Rep.
Rivers (South Carolina), Rep. Gathings (Arkansas). Id. at 3225-28.
8 Id. at 3217.
9 See id. at 3217-26.
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discusses claims, brought by black women under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, alleging employment discrimination
because of race and sex, that is, because of their status as black
women. This discussion serves both as an example of the prob-
lem of addressing "multiple status" discrimination in the law
and as a guide as we move into the discussion of the Equal
Protection Clause.1t
The second section of this Article explores the question of
how the group "black women" should be defined under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. It argues that,
whether defined as a subset of women, as a subset of blacks or
as a discrete group, black women should be granted the highest
level of protection available under the Constitution: the "strict
scrutiny" review used for race-based classifications. This sec-
tion will also consider whether or not the Court should grant
black women a higher level of protection than the "strict scru-
tiny" review it grants to the black group because of the long-
standing and egregious nature of the harm inflicted on black
women and because of the dual stigma of being black and
female.
The third section of the Article addresses two questions
raised by the conclusions of the preceding section. The first
question relates to the subset theory of formulating a class: if
the group "black women" is entitled to "strict scrutiny" protec-
tion because its members are a subset of the black group, what
of the black aged or the black retarded? Should all subsets of
blacks be treated in the same manner? The second question
arises from the argument that black women form a discrete
group based on their history as black Americans and as female
Americans, and that therefore this group is entitled to the high-
est level of protection currently available under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. What then of other groups of women-Hispanic
women or Asian women? Could they not make the same argu-
ments as black women? Does this create problems in terms of
the development of the Equal Protection Clause or in terms of
factionalizing American society?
10 Section One of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, "No State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
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I. Black Women as a Discrete Group
"Status" is a term which sociologically identifies one's po-
sition in society.1' Each status carries a set of norms, defined
as a pattern of behavior expected of persons of that particular
status. Status is frequently used as a means of ranking one's
social position or role. 12
Black women posess two statuses which derive from attri-
butes over which they have no control:13 membership in the
black race and membership in the female sex. The combination
of these two statuses creates a new status, 14 and because it is a
combination of two degraded statuses, black and female, the
new status is a particularly low-ranking one.15 In order to sup-
port this degraded status, society has created a system of my-
thology and misinterpretations about black women16 which fur-
ther limits the life opportunities of black women.
In a society which sees as powerful both whiteness and
maleness, black women posess no characteristic which is as-
sociated with power. They are therefore treated by society in a
manner which reflects a status different from, and lower than,
both black men (who have the status ascribed to maleness) and
white women (who enjoy the status ascribed to whiteness).17
This is in no way inconsistent with the fact that black women
" L. Duberman, Social Inequality: Class and Caste in America 38 (1986).
12 E. Chinoy, Society: An Introduction to Sociology 39-40 (1961).
13 See Duberman, supra note 11, at 94.
14 Epstein, Positive Effects of the Multiple Negative: Explaining the Success of
Black Professional Women, in Changing Women in a Changing Society 152 (1973).
's See Almquist, supra note 2, at 1.
16 See generally B. Hooks, Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism 51-86
(1981).
17 The fact that society as a whole sees black women as powerless, however, should
not obscure the very real strengths and contributions of black women. For the contri-
butions of black women in American history, see generally J. Jones, Labor of Love,
Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work and the Family, from Slavery to the Present
(1985); P. Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race
and Sex in America (1984); Black Women in Nineteenth Century American Life (1976);
Black Women in White America: A Documentary History (1972). In fact, it has been
argued that the very perception of the group as powerless has worked to the advantage
of certain group members. See, e.g., Epstein, The Positive Effects of the Multiple
Negative, supra note 14, at 7. But see Fulbright, The Myth of Double Advantage: Black
Female Managers in Slipping Through the Cracks: The Status of Black Women (Simms
and Malveaux eds. 1986) (rejecting Epstein's hypothesis as "mathematically sound but
intuitively illogical").
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are often treated badly along with black men solely because of
their race; or because of their sex along with white women. A
study on wages in New York State, conducted for the National
Committee on Pay Equity in 1986, confirms this disparity in the
treatment of black women. 18 The researchers found that the
wages of white women, minority men and minority women in
job categories which were comprised largely of members of
those groups, were systematically depressed. 19 The studies fur-
ther showed that the wages for women of color were depressed
further than those of both men of'color and white women.20 For
example, in New York State, job titles with high concentrations
of minority men were devalued by 1.59 salary grades2' while
those with a high concentration of white women were devalued
by 1.95 grades. The devaluation rate for women of color, how-
6ver, was 2.77 grades. 22 Two of the myths supporting the de-
graded status of black women are that they do not need money
and are not worth money. Thus both of these myths are per-
petuated by the economic structure of American society.
Since black women share a negative group label imposed
from the outside, they feel a need to come together for mutual
protection. This "perceived need to band together in defense
against domination or hostility" is one major source of cultural
identity.23 Although at one level it seems bizarre to request that
18 National Committee on Pay Equity, Pay Equity: An Issue of Race, Ethnicity and
Sex (1987).
V) Id. at 99-100.
20 Id. at 100. The women of color in this study were black and Hispanic.
21 Id. at 99-100. In New York State, an increase of one salary grade yields an
increase of approximately five percent in salary.
21 Id. at 99-100,
23 Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L.
Rev. 304 (1986). The early steps in group formation occur when individuals become
aware that they are being treated differently by society, and that this difference is based
on the group definition. It has been suggested that throughout the 1960's, as black
women moved into activities previously reserved for whites, they began to encounter
patterns of sex as well as race discrimination. Thus black women began to see them-
selves as a "special interest group" fighting to overcome both racial and sexual oppres-
sion, S. Baxter & M. Lansing, Women and Politics: The Visible Majority 108-12 (1983).
This may well be the reason for the rise of black feminism in the 1970's and 1980's, but
it is merely another cycle in the history of black women. One historian suggests that
black women began to organize and develop a consciousness as a group in the mid-
nineteenth century with the development of the Negro women's clubs. G. Lerner, The
Majority Finds Its Past: Placing Women in History 73 (1979). The black women's
suffrage movement in the early twentieth century was yet another cycle in this history.
See infra text accompanying notes 104-26.
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"black women" be identified as a group with degraded social
status, only through acceptance and utilization of this status will
the group be able to work to defeat limitations imposed on its
members from the outside. 24 The Constitution protects both the
choice to turn inward to the cultural group, and the choice to
use that group identity to participate fully in the institutions of
the wider society. 25
One example of how black women have asserted them-
selves as a group within the legal system is the litigation they
have initiated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,26
alleging employment discrimination. We examine these cases in
order to show why black women want to bring these claims as
a distinct group. We also consider how the courts have ad-
dressed the issue of "multiple status" discrimination under this
federal statute. We then explore the extent to which issues and
For constitutional purposes, however, it has never been required that there be
unanimity among the group members ifi order for them to be considered a discrete
group in American culture. The only requirement is that some group members, pur-
porting to represent the group, persuade a court that they have been denied the equal
protection of the laws based on that group status.
24 Minow recognizes the dilemma that occurs when one claims rights founded in
difference-that of re-emphaiizing stigma, of strengthening the very stereotypes that
produced the differences originally. Minow, When Difference Has its Home: Group
Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference,
22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 111 (1987). Although she suggests an alternate "social
relations" approach to equal protection analysis, wherein difference is not located in a
group or group member but resides instead as a comparison between grdups (id. at 138-
39), Minow also states that it would be folly to abandon rights analyses at this time,
due to the certainty provided by equating sameness of treatment with equality. Id. at
188.
2 Karst, supra note 23 at 10. Karst's thesis is that constitutional decisions about
equal citizenship promote a sense of belonging in two ways. First, they weaken the
caste system, thus providing more opportunity for those formerly excluded to move
into mainstream culture, and second, they eliminate the stigma placed on certain groups,
thereby making the group, and group membership, more attractive and valuable. Id. at
337-38. Thus one may both retain a strong connection to a particular cultural group,
and still belong to America. Id. at 361. For example, the Court's decision in Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), upholding agency guidelines requiring, inter alia, bi-
lingual education, both supports the right of Hispanic and Asian Americans to turn
inward toward their cultural group and simultaneously encourages them to assimilate
into the wider American society by providing more accessible education. Karst, supra,
at 335. Similarly, decisions which protect the right of religious outsiders to practice
their beliefs free of religious domination by the government allow them to maintain their
cultural identity and still participate fully in the wider community. See, e.g., Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (religious test for public office held unconstitutional).
Karst supra at 358.
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
16 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 24
problems raised under Title VII are transferable to the context
of the Constitution.
A. Claims of Race/Sex (Dual Status) Discrimination Under
Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrim-
ination in employment based on race, sex, religion, national
origin or color.27 All public and private employers with more
than fifteen employees are required to treat all present and
prospective employees in a non-discriminatory manner. 28 An
aggrieved individual proves a case of individual or class dispar-
ate treatment by comparing herself to similarly situated employ-
ees of a different race, sex, or national origin, and by showing
that she received less favorable treatment than that person (or
class of persons) due to her group status. 29 A group of employees
may also prove discrimination under Title VII by showing that
a facially neutral employment practice has an adverse impact
on that group and cannot be justified as a business necessity.30
When groups allege employment discrimination based upon
group status, often that discrimination is based upon one char-
acteristic, such as religion, sex, or race. However, employers
who discriminate do not always do so in such neat categories.
Just as widespread discrimination against black women as a
class has always existed in American society,3' widespread em-
ployment discrimination against the class has existed as well.
Since the enactment of Title VII, black women have gone to
court claiming discrimination, as individuals and as a group,
based on their distinct identity as black women. In 1980, the
Fifth Circuit became the first court of appeals to rule on the
issue of whether black women are protected as a discrete class
27 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000-2002 (1983).
8 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1983).
29 See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
(individual disparate treatment); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (class-
wide disparate treatment); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
30 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For a discussion of
the Supreme Court's recent application of disparate impact theory to subjective em-
ployment decisionmaking, see Recent Developments, 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 264
(1989).
31 See infra text accompanying notes 39-44.
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under Title VII, in Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Community Action
Association.3 2 The court held that they are so protected, noting
that discrimination against black females can exist even in the
absence of discrimination against black men or white women.33
The court further stated:
In the absence of a clear expression by Congress that
it did not intend to provide protection against discrim-
ination directed especially toward black women as a
class separate and distinct from the class of women
and the class of blacks, we cannot condone a result
which leaves black women without a viable Title VII
remedy. 34
The Jefferies court found further support for this position in the
Supreme Court's holdings and analysis in the "sex plus" cases.
In those cases the Court found that discrimination against cer-
tain subclasses of women violated Title VII.3 5 Since then, every
court which has ruled on the issue has agreed that black women
can claim, as a distinct group, Title VII protection against dis-
crimination based on the race/sex dual status. 36
While so holding, several courts nonetheless expressed con-
cern as to how such claims would be proved and defended within
the traditional evidentiary framework. 37 As one district court
noted, "the prospect of the creation of new classes of protected
32 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
33 Id. at 1032.
34 Id. at 1032.
35 Id. at 1033. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971)
(policy which discriminates against women with pre-school age children violates Title
VII's ban against sex discrimination).
36 Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); Judge v. Marsh, 649
F. Supp. 770, 779-80 (D.D.C. 1986); Chambers v. Omaha Girls' Club, 629 F. Supp. 925,
aff'd 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987); Graham v. Bendix, 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (D. Ind.
1984); Carter v. Dialysis Clinic, 28 FEP Cases 268, 269 (D. Ga. 1981). Other courts
have accepted the class claims put forward by black women without specifically ad-
dressing the issue. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, 773 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1985);
Wright v. Missouri Dept., 512 F. Supp. 729 (E.D. Mo. 1981). But see DeGraffenreid v.
General Motors Corp., 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (black women not special
Title VII class), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480, 484 (8th
Cir. 1977) (suggesting disagreement with district court's reasoning rejecting claim of
race/sex discrimination).
37 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Community Association, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034
(5th Cir. 1980).
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minorities, governed only by the mathematical principles of
permutation and combination, clearly raises the prospect of
opening the hackneyed Pandora's box."38 For this reason, the
court in Judge v. Marsh interpreted the Jefferies holding as
limited to employment decisions based on two protected char-
acteristics such as race and sex. 39 Such a limitation would, of
course, permit black women to press their group claims under
Title VII.
Black women have sought to claim this distinct status in
court because it is often the only way that they can prove that
they have been victims of remediable harm. The facts of the
Jefferies case provide one example of the importance of how
the claimant presents herself and her claim. In that case, Jef-
feries alleged that the employer discriminated in failing to pro-
mote her to the position of Field Representative in a county
agency. The person who was promoted into the job she sought
was a black man. 40 Jefferies was therefore not able to prove
race discrimination. Moreover, since statistical proof showed
that one of the previous Field Representatives had been a
woman, and that almost half of the supervisory positions within
the agency were held by women, 41 the plaintiff could not prove
sex discrimination. However, the evidence showed that every
position for which she had applied had been filled either by men
or White women.42 Therefore, she could logically claim that the
erAloyer had been discriminating against black women as a
class. Thus Jeffries was able to focus the proof of discrimination
on the harm committed against her as a black woman. Similarly,
in Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, 43 the plaintiffs were able to show
a hiring rate of black women in the range of five to eight standard
deviations below the "expected" level. 44 They were able, there-
"' DeGraffenreid, 413 F. Supp. at 145.
39 649 F. Supp. at 780. See also Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction
of Race and Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 793, 821 (1980)
(suggesting courts should reduce the danger of statistical manipulation in compound
discrimination cases by limiting the "compounding" to two protected characteristics).
4) Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1029.
41 Id. at 1030-31.
42 Id. at 1029.
43 773 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1985).
4Id. at 568-69. The probability that such a disparity could be explained by chance
alone is approximately one in a thousand.
The Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law has filed numerous lawsuits
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fore, to make a prima facie showing of discrimination. If, how-
ever, they had been required to commingle their statistical hiring
data with the hiring data for either black men or white women,
the standard deviation might well have been lower, thereby
masking the harm they had suffered, and making their argument
weaker.
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution are similar in that
both are used by disfavored groups to gain equal treatment by
society. Title VII and the Constitution are dissimilar, however,
in many ways, such as coverage, burden of proof and remedies.
The major difference, for the purposes of this Article, between
Title VII and the Constitution is that under Title VII, protected
groups are always treated in the same manner. Whether alleging
discrimination because they are Jews, Mexican Americans,
women or Asians, those covered by the statute receive the same
level of protection, regardless of their group affiliation. A failure
to hire claim raised by a group of women (sex discrimination)
is assessed in the same way as one raised by a group of Mexican
Americans (national origin discrimination). Even a group which
presents itself with a race and sex claim under Title VII, for
example black women, receives the same level of protection as
all other groups covered by the statute. 45 The Equal Protection
Clause differs from Title VII in that the level of protection
changes depending upon which group is presenting the equal
protection claim, and depending upon how much protection the
Court thinks is warranted based on that group's social and
historical status. 46 Thus, under Title VII, black women assert
their rights as a separate group in order to focus the evidence
on the particular harm where that harm is to black women as a
against southern textiles companies, such as Bloomsburg Mills, alleging failure to hire
black women. Seymour, A Point of View: Why Executive Order 11246 Should Be
Preserved, 11 Emp. Rel. L.J. 568, 575 (1986). Lawyers for the Committee discovered
an industry-wide pattern wherein "white men and white women were hired for desirable
jobs, black men were hired for low-paying, undesirable jobs, and black women were
simply not hired at all."
45 As the district court noted in Judge v. Marsh, recognition of black women as a
distinct group under Title VII does not alter the proof framework. 649 F. Supp. at 780.
Also, despite the concerns of the district court in DeGraffenreid, the group "black
women" is neither seeking, nor entitled to "greater standing than ... a black male"
under Title VII. 413 F. Supp. at 145.
46 See infra text accompanying notes 21-23.
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class. Under an equal protection analysis, black women might
proceed as a separate group not only to focus the evidence with
particularity on the harm done to black women, but also in order
to get the court to assess the evidence within a framework which
offers more protection to black women than it might to white
women or to black men. 47 It is because of this difference be-
tween Title VII and the Constitution that a new analysis is
required to situate the group "black women" within the Equal
Protection Clause, and to consider how this group should be
treated by the courts.
II. The Equal Protection Clause
The way in which a group is defined for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause 48 both describes how that group is
viewed by the larger society, and defines how that group should
be viewed. The Court must see how the group has been treated
historically by the larger society before it decides what level of
protection it will provide the group. For example, in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,49 the Court had to decide
whether a zoning ordinance which excluded group homes for
the mentally retarded violated the Equal Protection Clause. In
order to do this, the Court had to determine whether a classifi-
cation based on mental retardation reflected "prejudice and an-
tipathy" by society, "an outmoded notion" of the capabilities of
the mentally retarded, or whether the mentally retarded have
"distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has
the authority to implement. '50 The Court determined that the
classification made by legislators based on mental retardation
reflected not prejudice, but a concern for the real differences in
ability to function; and therefore it refused to presume that even
those legislative actions which disadvantaged the retarded were
constitutionally invalid. 5 Thus, the perception of the Court and
society of the mentally retarded determined the level of consti-
tutional protection the group was to be afforded.
41 See itfra text accompanying notes 31-47.
"1 See supra note 10, at 5.
49 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
50 Id. at 441.
51 Id. at 448.
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A. The Framework for Group Protection Under the Equal
Protection Clause
The groups possessing the clearest definition, and therefore
the highest level of protection under the Constitution, are racial
and ethnic minorities. As the Court noted in Korematsu v. U.S.,
"legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect. '52 Such laws are subject to strict
scrutiny and will be sustained only if they serve a compelling
state interest.5 3 Thus, black Americans, both male and female,
are entitled to the highest level of protection under the Consti-
tution when confronted with state action which restricts them
due to their race.
Women, along with several other groups,54 come after racial
and ethnic minorities in this hierarchy of protection. The Court
has determined that a classification which has a- negative effect
on women is not "immediately suspect," although it is subject
to a heightened standard of review. The government need only
show that the classification is substantially related to an impor-
tant government objective for it to be held constitutionally per-
missible under the Equal Protection Clause.
The third category of groups are those which have been
defined by the Court as not needing and therefore not entitled
to any heightened level of scrutiny. The Court will defer to the
legislative body in cases of classifications based on age, 55 out of
state persons,56 new residents in the state57 or the mentally
retarded, 58 as long as the classification is "rationally related" to
a legitimate state interest.
52 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
-3 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964).
m' See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982) (classification based on alienage); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)
(classifications based on illegitimacy).
55 Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
56 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
57 Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
58 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432. Several Justices have
discussed the need to modify this tripartite system of equal protection analysis. See,
e.g., City of Cleburne at 449, (Stevens and Burger, concurring); 473 U.S. at 451 (Mar-
shall, Brennan and Blackmun, concurring). This article's analysis is based on the
tripartite system, however, because it is still the basis for the Court's analysis, and
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Given this schema, black women can find specific protec-
tion under the Equal Protection Clause as either blacks or as
women and, in fact, have already done so. Surely black women
were protected as blacks in, for example, Gomillion v. Light-
foot,59 which involved racial gerrymandering for voting pur-
poses. Black women were granted protection as women, along
with white women, in Califano v. Westcott,60 which involved
the use of a gender-based classification to allocate benefits to
families with dependent children. If, however, a group of black
women makes the claim that it is being denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws because its members are both black and women,
it is not clear what kind of constitutional protection this group
will be provided. Should the scrutiny level be "strict" because
the women are black or should it be the lesser, heightened level
of scrutiny because these blacks are women, or is the answer
to acknowledge that black women constitute a discrete group in
American culture whose position in society should be analyzed
separately to determine what level of scrutiny should attach to
state action which adversely affects them?
It is unlikely that a statutory classification which explicitly
limits the opportunities of black women can be found today,
although such classifications did exist in the past.6' It is not
unlikely, however, that there are statutory classifications which
place an overwhelming burden on black women.
The Court has held that facially neutral laws, which impose
heavier burdens on a suspect class, do not alone violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 62 That type of discriminatory impact
is insufficient; plaintiffs must be able to show discriminatory
intent. Although such discriminatory intent may be inferred
from the totality of the relevant facts, a statistical showing of
adverse impact on the protected group, standing alone, is not
equivalent to proof of a constitutional violation. The question
then becomes whether black women can prove an intent to
because it is still true that the Court's choice of category is the decision which ultimately
determines whether or not the state classification will be upheld. See City of Cleburne,
473 U.S. 432 (Justice White writing for the plurality).
59 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
60 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
61 See infra text accompanying notes 31-32.
62 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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discriminate against them, specifically, as a class. As the Court
noted in Hunter v. Underwood, statistical proof of harm plus
historical testimony tending to show an intent to discriminate
would be sufficient to make out a constitutional violation. 63
Such a prima facie showing could be made as follows. In
1952, when seventy percent of all of the mothers with one or
more illegitimate children in Georgia were black,6 a Georgia
legislator proposed a bill making it a misdeameanor for women
to give birth to an illegitimate child. 65 If one were to transport
this situation to the present, black women could show that the
law imposes a substantially heavier burden upon them than upon
any other group. Also, given statements by the state welfare
director that he wanted to limit aid to the children of unwed
black mothers, 66 the plaintiffs could make a credible equal pro-
tection argument.
B. The Protection of Black Women as a Class Within the
Framework of the Equal Protection Clause
There are three possible ways to protect black women
within the equal protection framework. The first is to treat black
women as a subset of blacks or of women, and to grant their
claims the level of protection accorded that group under the
current tripartite analysis of the Court. The second is to treat
black women as a discrete group seeking protection under the
Constitution, and to assess that group on its own merits to
determine the level of protection it should be afforded. One
might analyze the situation of black women in this society as
that of a "discrete and insular" minority which is unable to enjoy
the benefits of full citizenship, and thus entitled to strict scrutiny
protection under the Equal Protection Clause. Third, one might
argue that since black women carry the burden of membership
in the black group, which is already entitled to strict scrutiny
protection, and in the disfavored female group, they should be
entitled to more than strict scrutiny protection by the courts.
63 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
6 W. Bell, Aid to Dependent Children 81 (1965).
61 Id. at 67.
66 Id. at 67.
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1. The Subset Theory
How are black women to be sub-classified: in the black
group, or in the female group? This question is important be-
cause the level of protection granted black women will differ
depending upon whether they are placed in the black group or
the female group. Yet the notion that the level of protection
would change depending upon which way they are classified is
bizarre since black women are always both black and women.
To the extent that they are always burdened by both classifi-
cations, the level of protection should be constant. Moreover,
since black women are always stigmatized by the race classifi-
cation, they should always be provided the highest level of
protection available under the Constitution. If we accept the
Court's formulation that race classifications are inherently more
suspect than sex classifications, we must therefore conclude that
the Court considers the status of racial minorities to be "lower"
than the status of women. Thus if black women are provided
only intermediate scrutiny, as women, a portion of the burden
they carry will have gone completely unaddressed by the legal
system. As long as race is part of the group identity, any clas-
sification which limits their opportunities should be reviewed
under the highest level of scrutiny.
2. The "Discrete and Insular Minority" Theory
The second possibility is to treat black women as a discrete
group seeking protection under the Constitution, and to assess
the group on its own merits to determine the level of protection
it should be afforded. Black women are entitled to the greatest
constitutional protection under the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause they can be viewed just as the Court has viewed other
groups which have sought the same level of protection. In mak-
ing this determination, the Court has traditionally looked at
several criteria to determine if a group is a "discrete and insular"
minority,67 and thus unable to enjoy the benefits of full citizen-
ship. The basic criteria are: whether or not the group is defined
67 U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1937).
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by immutable characteristics,68 whether or not there has been
historical prejudice against the group, 69 and the extent to which
the group is politically powerless. 70 A classification which re-
flects deep-seated prejudice against a particular group would be
equally suspect. 71
a. Immutable Characteristics
Race, gender, national origin, mental retardation and
(il)legitimacy are all immutable characteristics which often ad-
versely affect the way certain people are treated in our society.
Hence, the Court is more likely to see a group as one needing
protection if one of these characteristics is part of its social
group identity. This category has not been applied consistently
or rigorously, however. Some groups classified on the basis of
their immutable characteristics, such as mentally retarded citi-
zens, have not been given the highest level of protection,72
whereas other groups defined by mutable characteristics, such
as alienage, have been granted such protection. 73 Despite this
confusion, clearly race and sex are immutable characteristics,
and black women thus satisfy this prong of the test.
b. Historical Prejudice
The role of history is critical in the determination of what
level of protection a group receives. As Justice Holmes has
noted, in determining which groups are "discrete and insular,"
"a page of history is worth a volume of logic." 74 Justice Marshall
has further stated on this point that:
The lessons of history and experience are surely the
best guide as to when, and with respect to what inter-
6s See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
69 See, e.g., San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
70 See, e.g., Mass. Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
71 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
72 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
73 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
74 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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ests, society is likely to stigmatize individuals as mem-
bers of an inferior caste or view them as not belonging
to the community. Because prejudice spawns preju-
dice, and stereotypes produce limitations that confirm
the stereotype on which they are based, a history of
unequal treatment requires sensitivity to the prospect
that its vestiges endure. 75
History proves that black women suffered a dual degrada-
tion, both as black slaves and as women. Although black women
did not suffer any more than black men as a result of slavery,
it is fair to say that they suffered differently, because they were
women. As blacks they were exploited for their physical
strength in the production of crops; as women, they performed
a reproductive function which was crucial to the economic in-
terests of the slaveholders. 76 As one historian notes, "Blacks
constituted a permanent labor force and metaphor that were
perpetuated through the Black woman's womb. '77 The repro-
ductive function became especially important after 1801, when
it became illegal to import slaves from Africa into the United
States.78
Black slave women were sexually exploited for other than
reproductive reasons. Their objectification as sexual beings also
served the function of demonstrating power, and of terrorizing
the entire slave community. Rape and the constant threat of
rape was not only a means of crushing attempts at resistance
by black women, but was also a means of humiliating and sym-
bolically attacking black men.79
Statutes enacted during the pre-Civil War period legitimated
this power relationship.80 For example, statutes in Virginia si-
multaneously provided that: it was not unlawful for a white man
to have sex with a black female slave; it was a crime for whites
75 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
76 J. Jones, supra note 17, at 11-12; Hine and Wittenstein, Female Slave Resistance:
The Economics of Sex, in The Black Woman Cross-Culturally 296 (F. Steady ed. 1981).
7 Giddings, supra note 17, at 39.
78 Hine, supra note 76, at 296.
" Davis, Reflections on the Black Woman's Role in the Community of Slaves, 12
Black Scholar 3, 12-14 (1981); Lerner, supra note 23, at 69-73.
90 Giddings, supra note 17, at 43-45.
1989] Black Women and the Constitution
to marry blacks; and the status of a child was based on the
mother's status. These laws encouraged the exploitation of
black women by white men, and discouraged the legitimation
of their sexual relationships by marriage. 81
During this period, black women unlike white women were
often grouped along with white and black men as persons who
were to till the soil.82 A 1643 Virginia statute, for example, stated
that "tithable persons"-those who worked the ground, whether
slave or free-included all adult men and black women. Mary-
land enacted a similar statute in 1664. 83
After the Civil War, both the states and the federal govern-
ment acted in ways inimical to the interests of black women,
treating them, again, differently from white women and black
men. Guidelines created by the Freedman's Bureau required
that black women receive lesser wages than black men, based
on their sex. 84 Agents of the Bureau also gave less monetary
support to former slave families with female heads of households
than to those with male heads of households. 85
The subsequent history of black women as workers fol-
lowed slave history by reinforcing the view of black women as
either domestic servants or manual laborers. 86
SI A.L. Higginbotham, In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Pro-
cess: The Colonial Period 43 (1978). For a similar discussion of the laws of Georgia and
Pennsylvania, see id. at 58 and 251.
r Anna Jhlia Cooper, born a slave, spoke poignantly of the struggle of black women
tto protect themselves and'their daughters from sexual exploitation:
3 Yet all through the darkest period of the colored women's oppression in this
country her yet unwritten history is full of heroic struggle, a struggle against
fearful and overwhelming odds, that often ended in a horrible death, to maintain
and protect that which woman holds dearer than life. The painful, patient, and
silent toil of mothers to gain a fee simple title to the bodies of their daughters,
the despairing fight, as of an entrapped tigress, to keep hallowed their own
persons, would furnish material for epics.
Black Women in Nineteenth Century American Life, supra note 17, at 329 (statement
made by Cooper in 1893 to the Congress of Representative Women, on the status of
black women).
82 Giddings, supra note 17, at 36-37; W. Jordan, White Over Black: American
Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812, at 77 (1968).
13 Giddings, supra note 17, at 36-37.
84 Jones, supra note 17, at 62.
5 Id. at 62.
6The subsequent history also followed slave history by reinforcing the view of
black women as sexually available and unprotected from sexual exploitation or attack.
Black Women in White America, supra note 17, at 149-63; Ellis, Sexual Harassment
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After the Civil War, black women worked largely in rural
areas in the South as sharecroppers or in urban areas as do-
mestics in white households. Since the image of black women
was limited to that of a domestic, and not, for example, worker
in the cotton mills, 87 domestic jobs were "reserved" for black
women. 88 Therefore, black women, unlike the women of any
other group, replaced the men in their families as primary
breadwinners 89 while still bearing responsibility for the tradi-
tional "wifely" duties. The exploitation of black women as do-
mestics was not a regional phenomenon, however. Despite the
fact that the black women who migrated to the North tended to
be younger and better educated than those left behind in the
South, 90 by 1905 ninety percent of all the black women working
in New York City were domestics. 91 Black women were com-
pletely excluded from sales and clerical work.92
During the Depression, southern black women returned to
farm work and migratory labor camps; in the North, domestic
servants were forced to look for jobs through "slave markets."
Wages dropped drastically. A survey of wages of domestics in
Mississippi showed that the average weekly pay was less than
two dollars per week. In Philadelphia in 1932, domestics earned
between five and twelve dollars per week. 93 Despite the overall
benefits of the public works projects of the thirties that were
initiated by the Roosevelt Administration, many job training and
job referral opportunities were closed to black women. 94 This
and Race: A Legal Analysis of Discrimination, 8 Notre Dame J. of Leg. 30, 39-41
(1981). See also Gruber and Bjorn, Blue-Collar Blues: The Sexual Harassment of Women
Autovorkers, 9 Work and Occupation 271, 284-85 (1982) (black women harassed more
frequently and more severely than white women). The dynamic which encourages the
sexual exploitation of black women workers also exists outside the work environment,
and influences the likelihood of sexual attack. Black women are between two to three
times more likely to be raped than white women. The profile of the most frequent rape
victim in this country is a young woman, divorced or separated, poor, and black. A.
Karmen, Introduction to Part II Women Victims of Crime, in The Criminal Justice
System and Women 188 (Price & Sokoloff eds. 1982).
" Giddings, supra note 17, at 135-36.
"Id. at 112.
9Id. at 112.
90 Id. at 155.
91 Id. at 156.
9Id. at 178.
93 Id. at 206-07.
4Jones, supra note 17, at 216-18.
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was directly attributable to southern whites' concern that help-
ing black women find better jobs would eliminate an important
source of cheap labor for white households and for the fields.
Thus, public works officials in the South manipulated wages and
job assignments to preserve racial and sexual inequities. 95
These inequities were maintained throughout World War
II, as black women moved into jobs in industry. There they
were assigned to the most dangerous, backbreaking tasks in
segregated job categories. 96 Black women were routinely as-
signed to jobs that required them to stand in rooms filled with
toxic fumes. White women, on the other hand, were given the
jobs which allowed them to sit in well-ventilated rooms. 97 Black
women were also routinely assigned to work the night shift. 98
The Armed Forces discriminated against black women by forc-
ing them to maintain the role of domestic. Army records disclose
that in at least one instance, black women were court-martialed
for refusing to accept kitchen assignments, a job to which white
women in the Army were not assigned. 99
Within the past 20 years, the relative economic status of
those black women with jobs has improved, in large part due to
the increased convergence of their job structures with those of
white women. 100 This convergence only underscores the fact
that black women are moving into essentially low-status, dead-
end jobs. Despite this convergence, black women are still the
lowest-paid group when compared to white women, black men,
or white men. 101 Even with the improvements, black women still
face significantly higher unemployment rates than any other
group. For example, black female unemployment rates have
been twice those of white women throughout the past decade.10 2
951 d. at 216-21.
96 Id. at 240.
97 Id. at 240.
91 Id. at 240.
99 Id. at 253.
100 P.A. Wallace, Black Women in the Labor Force 23-25 (1980).
101 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Times of Change: 1983 Handbook on Women Workers 29
(1983) [hereinafter Times of Change). See also National Committee on Pay Equity supra
note 18, at 15-16.
102 Jones, Black Women and Labor Force Participation: An Analysis of Sluggish
Growth Rates, in Slipping Through the Cracks, supra note 17, at 17. In 1981, the
unemployment rate for black women was 15.6%, compared to 8.2% for white women.
Times of Change, supra note 101, at 29. This unemployment ratio has remained constant
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The history of dual oppression which has operated and
continues to operate in the marketplace thus continues to limit
the life opportunities of black women. The effects on the black
community are devastating. In 1970, fifty-six percent of all poor
black families were maintained by women; by 1981, that figure
had jumped to seventy percent.10 3 In 1981, there were 22.1
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births to black women, com-
pared to 6.5 maternal deaths per 100,000 births for white
women. ,04
c. Political Powerlessness
The political powerlessness of black women is best illus-
trated by their struggle for the right to vote. As members of two
disenfranchised groups, they were forced to struggle twice, both
as blacks and as women, to gain a meaningful franchise. More-
over, as the least powerful members within both the black and
the female groups, black women have had to fight to make their
voices heard at all. Thus the heaviest burden in terms of im-
proving their social condition has fallen on, and continues to
fall on, the group occupying the weakest political position. 0 5
During the debates on whether the franchise should be
extended to black men through the fifteenth amendment, 0 6 some
black women hesitated to support the measure because they
were not sure they could count on black men for protection.
Sojourner Truth, for example, opposed the amendment, fearing
the even greater oppression of black women. 0 7 In the formal
during a period when young black women have increased their median years of schooling
faster than have young white women, suggesting that education yields lower returns to
black women than to whites. Id. at 17-19.
103 Times of Change, supra note 101, at 29. The comparable increase for white
families is from thirty percent to thirty-nine percent. Id. at 29.
"0 Headen and Headen, General Health Conditions and Medical Insurance Issues
Concerning Black Women in Slipping Through the Cracks, supra note 17, at 187.
210 See M. Marable, How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America: Problems in
Race, Political Economy and Society 103 (1983) ("Historically, Black women have
carried the greatest burden in the battle for democracy in this country.")
10 Section 1 of the fifteenth amendment states: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
207 Giddings, supra note 17, at 64-65.
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political conventions held by blacks during this period, there
were no reported women delegates. 108
Many white women worked hard for the passage of the
fifteenth amendment, hoping that they could link the issues of
black suffrage and women's suffrage.10 9 This, however, did not
prove possible. 10
After passage of the fifteenth amendment, social reformers
turned to considering whether or not the franchise should be
extended to women through the nineteenth amendment to the
Constitution."' At this time, black women suffragists struggled
for their enfranchisement in black women's organizations, or in
segregated chapters of white women's organizations; they
marched for their enfranchisement in segregated suffrage pa-
rades." 2 However, many powerful forces in the country were
convinced that extending the franchise to black women posed
considerable risks. White women in the women's movement
were concerned that requesting extension of the franchise to
108 Jones, supra note 17, at 66.
109 E. DuBois, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony: Correspondence, Writ-
ings and Speeches 89-90 (1981). However, other white feminists, including Elizabeth
Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, refused to support the fifteenth amendment once
it became clear that the franchise would be extended to black men only. Id. at 91.
At least one legislator, Senator Cowan of Pennsylvania, linked the issues of black
suffrage and women's suffrage when he stated: "If I have no reason to offer why a
Negro man shall not vote, I have no reason why a white woman shall not vote." G.
Myrdal, An American Dilemma 1076 (1944). Extension of the franchise to black women
was, in his view at least, not even under consideration.
110 The anger of white women suffragists at losing this issue often took on racist
tones, showing once again the political division between black and white women.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a co-founder of the American Equal Rights Association, "made
derogatory references to 'Sambo' and to the enfranchisement of Africans, Chinese, and
all the ignorant foreigners the moment they touch our shores." E. Flexner, Century of
Struggle 147 (1975). Almost one hundred years later, during the legislative debates on
Title VII, Rep. Martha Griffiths drew on this history and this anger when she stated, in
discussing the possibility that Congress would prohibit employment discrimination based
on race, but not on sex:
It would be incredible to me that white men would be willing to place white
women at such a disadvantage except that white men have done this before
... your great grandfathers were willing as prisoners of their own prejudice
to permit ex-slaves to vote, but not their own white wives.
E.E.O.C., supra note 7, at 3219.
I The nineteenth amendment states, in part: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex."
112 Lerner, supra note 23, at 104.
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black women would damage their chances of gaining the vote
for themselves." 3 Southern states were concerned about what
the extension of the vote to black women would mean for their
way of life. In 1914, for example, in South Carolina there were
100,000 more blacks than whites and the largest group of poten-
tial voters was black women. " 4 Senator Smith of South Carolina
voiced concern about this fact when he stated: "If it was a crime
to enfranchise the male half of this race, why is it not a crime
to enfranchise the other half? ... [I]t was perfectly competent
for the legislatures ... to so frame their laws as to preserve our
civilization without entangling legislation involving women of
the black race. ' '"15 This concern about extending the vote to
black women was not limited to the South. For example, in
1914, after enfranchising women, the Illinois state legislature
attempted to eliminate black women from the rolls. 1 6 On the
federal level, while the suffrage bill was in the southern-domi-
nated Senate, several congressmen proposed amendments
which would have limited the scope of the amendment to white
women. 117
When black women finally obtained the vote under the
nineteenth amendment, whites harassed them with the intention
of rendering that vote useless. In various states black women
were subject to tax and property requirements imposed on them
exclusively, were given special "educational tests," or were
forced to wait to register to vote until after white women had
registered." 8
The history of political powerlessness of black women be-
comes even more apparent when examining the number of group
members who are elected officials on the local, state and federal
11 Terborg.Penn, Discontented Black Feminists: Prelude and Postscript to the
Passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, in Decades of Discontent: The Women's Move-
ment, 1920-1940, at 263 (Scharf & Jensen eds. 1983). See also Giddings, supra note 17,
at 162, for a statement by the president of the National American Women's Association
that black women should sacrifice themselves and apply for the vote later.
14 Giddings, supra note 17, at 123.
"5 Flexner, supra note 110, at 314.
116 Giddings, supra note 17, at 159. Senator Borah of Idaho also stated publicly that
"[niobody intends that the two and a half million Negro women of the South shall vote
... " Flexner, supra note 110, at 314-15. See also B.H. Andolsen, Daughters of
Jefferson, Daughters of Bootblacks: Racism and American Feminism 67-68 (1986).
" Giddings, supra note 17, at 159.
118 Id. at 165.
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government levels. If one's power be determined by the ability
to elect representatives who are members of one's group and
who are therefore more likely to represent that group's interests,
the statistics for black women tell a tale of little power. In 1985,
there were 392 black elected officials in the legislative bodies of
forty-two states and the Virgin Islands. Of that number, only
seventy-four were black women.119 Of the twenty black con-
gressmen at the federal level, only one was a black woman. 20
Of the twenty-six black mayors of cities with a population over
50,000, only one was a black woman. 121
If political power be determined by wealth, all indicators
again point to black women as a group without power. Black
women are over-represented among the poor. For example,
although the incidence of poverty among all women with chil-
dren under age eighteen is high, the poverty rate for black
mothers is approximately three times that of white mothers.122
Even controlling for age and education, the poverty rates for
black women are generally two to four times higher than the
rates for white women.1 23 Their poverty rate is also higher than
that of black men. For example, twenty-eight percent of all black
women who have finished high school are poor, compared to
sixteen percent of black male graduates. 124
Analyses of social indicators for political alienation also
demonstrate that black women feel politically powerless. A 1972
study by the Center for Political Studies showed that black
women are "polarized in a set of attitudes different from those
of black men and whites": a set of attitudes exemplified by a
sense of powerlessness and lack of control over their lives; a
sense of being forced to live "unsatisfying and insecure lives."
Black women, compared to white women and black and white
119 Joint Center for Political Studies, Black Elected Officials: A National Roster 2,
19-20 (1985).
120 Id. at 16.
'l Id. at 18. In 1986 there were 843 elected and appointed black judges in the United
States. Of that number, only 151 were women. See Joint Center for Political Studies,
Elected and Appointed Black Judges in the United States (1986).
'2 Times of Change, supra note 101, at 100. The poverty definition used here is
that established by the federal government to determine eligibility for certain federally
funded assistance programs. Id. at 99.
23 Id. at 103.124 Id. at 105. The comparable figure for white women is 8.8%.
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men, were shown to have the lowest levels of trust in the
political process and the lowest feelings of political efficacy.125
A 1976 study of the quality of American life reinforced this
finding. The analysts discovered that black women were more
negative in their overall sense of well-being and satisfaction than
black men or whites and concluded that "Itihe quality of life of
the black female appears less positive than that of any of the
other segments of the population .... "126 Thus, both history
and social science demonstrate that black women, a group de-
fined by two immutable characteristics, have suffered over the
centuries from prejudice based on their group characteristics.
As a result, black women have suffered, and continue to suffer
from political powerlessness within our society. Therefore,
black women clearly belong to a group which is entitled to be
classified as "discrete and insular" for purposes of determining
the level of scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims.
3. The "More than Strict Scrutiny" Theory
The final possibility is that black women-who are bur-
dened by the double stigma of race and sex-are entitled to
more than even the "strict scrutiny" level of review accorded
when there is a state action which harms based on race. If the
race stigma alone is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny review,
the race stigma plus an additional stigma (sex) should entitle the
group to an even higher level of scrutiny and protection by the
Court. As noted above, these double burdens are at least addi-
tive. In some instances, the dual burdens create a level of harm
even greater than the sum of the parts. 127
How could a court provide more than a "strict scrutiny"
level of review? It could ease the burden of proof in equal
protection cases brought by black women by lessening the re-
quirement for a showing of intent, for example. By so doing, a
court would, in effect, be taking judicial notice of the double
115 Baxter and Lansing, supra note 23, at 91, 97-99.
126 A. Campbell, P.E. Converse and W.L. Rodgers, The Quality of American Life:
Perceptions, Evaluations, and Satisfactions 464-65 (1976). Cf. A. Lorde, Sister Out-
sider: Essays and Speeches 145 (1984). ("Every black woman in America lives her life
somewhere along a wide curve of ancient and unexpressed angers.")
127 See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
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burdens carried by black women, and the likelihood that the
group identity continues to operate to their detriment. 128 Simi-
larly, in an employment discrimination case it could require a
lesser showing of harm before requiring a state employer to
engage in affirmative action for black women. There are many
ways a court could recognize that "race plus another burden"
should be protected at the level of "strict scrutiny plus more.1 129
In analytical terms, such a step is a logical extension of the
equal protection framework created by the Court. Realistically,
however, it seems unlikely that the Court will break ground for
a group that it barely acknowledges as a separate class. None-
theless, it is a logical next step for a court brave enough to take
it.
III. Further Questions
This Article argues that black women can be viewed as a
subset of blacks, and are therefore entitled to the highest level
of constitutional protection by virtue of their membership in the
black class. 30 It further argues that based on their history and
position in society, black women can be seen as a discrete group
which can be assessed on its own for purposes of determining
the level of protection it should receive under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.' These conclusions raise new questions about the
further direction of developments under the Equal Protection
Clause, questions which are addressed in this section.
The first question concerns the theory that black women
are a subset of the black group, and therefore qualify for the
121 Cf. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (burden of proof eased
in Title VII retaliation claim where plaintiff already proved underlying claims of sexual
harassment).
129 Although I am convinced by the argument that the double burden carried by
black women entitles them to more than strict scrutiny review, it is personally difficult
to argue that black women should get more protection than black men under the Equal
Protection Clause. Black men are family and it seems an unhappy splitting of the family
to say that the women of that family are entitled to more than the men. The reality is,
however, that black women are not creating factions within the black community but
are responding to them. A legal analysis which recognizes the factions created by the
larger society is only recognizing the historical and social realities which make certain
remedies necessary.
130 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 26-46.
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highest level of protection based on that status. 132 If this theory
applies, does it follow that other subsets of black groups, with
secondary characteristics which do not warrant the highest level
of protection (i.e., aged, retarded), merit the same consideration
as black women? That is, should the black aged and the black
retarded also be treated as the black female group?
The answer is yes. Subsets, such as the black aged and the
black retarded, are in the same analytical position as black
women for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, and should
be treated the same way. Since the stigma of race always exists
in these instances, the level of protection accorded the race
group must also be granted to subsets of that group.
In its decision on "dual discrimination" claims brought un-
der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fifth Circuit
maintained, in dicta, that such claims should be limited to those
groups sharing two immutable traits, such as race and sex. 133
That analysis applied here would distinguish between, on the
one hand, black women or the black retarded (all immutable
traits), and on the other, the black aged (age, though irreversible,
is not immutable). Such distinctions could be made, but would
make no analytical sense.
One way of thinking about this question is to ask why, in
any given case, the Court declined to extend heightened review
to a particular group. What did the group lack that made the
Court feel comfortable about giving it a lesser level of protec-
tion? In the case of the aged, the Court reasoned that the aged
"have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment' or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abili-
ties. 1' 34 This void, however, is filled by adding membership in
the black group, a group which has experienced such a history
and has been subjected to such disabilities. 135 Thus, the com-
bined category "black aged" possesses the indicia of other
groups which qualify for "strict scrutiny" protection. Due to the
132 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
131 Jefferies v. Harris City Community Action Association, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033-34
(5th Cir. 1980).
13' Mass. Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
135 Id. at 313.
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force of the race stigma in this society, any group which is part
of the black group must be granted the highest level of protection
available under the Constitution.
A second issue is raised by the argument that black women
can be considered a discrete group for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause. If this is true, what about Asian women and
Hispanic women? Where do these double categories stop?
In Judge v. Marsh the district court allowed a group of
black women to bring a Title VII claim based on their status as
black women, but expressed concern that creating such
subgroups turned the statute into a "many-headed Hydra. ' 136
The court was concerned that subgroups for every possible
combination of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion
could be created, and wondered "whether any employer could
make an employment decision under such a regime without
incurring a volley of discrimination charges.' 1 37 The concern,
then, is with the "slippery slope": What are we letting ourselves
in for if we start down this path? In a recent case which raised
similar "slippery slope" concerns, the Court stated that the
petitioner lost the case because there was "no limiting principle"
to the type of challenge he brought to the Court. 38 The task
here, then, is to see if there is a "limiting principle" to the notion
that groups may define themselves in different ways for pur-
poses of constitutional protection.
In reality, because of the way the Equal Protection Clause
has developed, it is already self-limiting. A group demanding
recognition and protection from the Court must show that it is
discrete, insular and powerless. It must show as well that this
group definition is causing it to be denied the equal protection
of the laws. To the extent that other "dual" groups-Asian
women, for example-could show a group identity and harm to
the group based 'on that identity, it is hard to see why they
should not be equally protected. There is no way to read the
language of the Equal Protection Clause to limit the scope of its
protection to a small number of groups. 139
136 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986).
137 Id. at 780.
138 McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 283 (1987).
,39 Courts have accepted the argument that the scope of Title VII is limited to
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Another approach to the "many-headed Hydra" problem
would be to imagine the worst possible scenario if this type of
group redefinition were permitted. Again, it is instructive to
look at the concerns raised by courts under Title VII as a starting
point. In Judge v. Marsh, the court was concerned that an
employer would not be able to make any employment decision
at all without fear of facing a discrimination claim if the claims
of subgroups were allowed. Despite the court's concern about
the future, this statement reflects today's reality. The Supreme
Court has already decided that Title VII's prohibition of race
discrimination protects white workers as well as black, and that
its prohibition against sex discrimination protects male workers
as well as female.140 If an employer is covered by Title VII, it
is true at present that she cannot make any employment decision
at all without considering the possibility of a Title VII charge.
Similarly, every citizen is protected by the Equal Protection
Clause. Ultimately, any "dual discrimination" claim raises issues
of proof. 41 The question then becomes whether the group alleg-
ing harm will be allowed to focus the proof on the harm caused
them by their dual status and thus be able to receive a remedy. 142
certain finite groups, due to the specific statutory language in Section 703(a) prohibiting
employment discrimination based on an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." See, e.g., De Santis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d
327 (9th Cir. 1979) (homosexuals not protected under Title VII ban against sex discrim-
ination). However, even where the statute speaks of certain defined groups, the courts
have been unwilling to read the statute so narrowly as to exclude claims brought by a
class of black women, where the statute already protects blacks and women against
discrimination under the prohibition against discrimination based on race or sex, and
where such a reading would allow discrimination to go unremedied. See supra text
accompanying notes 14-18.
140 See Newport News v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (men protected against sex
discrimination); McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)
(whites protected against race discrimination). It should also be noted that when white
men have alleged sex/race bias in "reverse discrimination" suits, courts have assumed
without discussion that the dual category "white males" is protected by Title VII.
Shoben, supra note 39, at 798.
'41 Cf. Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1986) (recognizing new group
does not change employer's burden of proof under Title VII).
"I An alternative approach to this problem would be to balance the burden of the
employer against the burden carried by black women. Note that the district court in
Judge v. Marsh was concerned with the problems an employer might have to face if
confronted with this "many-headed Hydra." Surely, if weighed in the balance, the rights
of black women to be free from employment discrimination are stronger than the right
of the employer to be able to make employment decisions without thinking through the
consequences of those decisions on protected classes.
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Conclusion
This Article presents a way to view "new" groups which
have reconstituted themselves from groups formally recognized
and granted particular constitutional status by the Court. A
group may either define itself as a subset of one of the groups,
or as a new, discrete group created by a unique history and
place in society. Because all "persons" are. protected by the
Equal Protection Clause, and because there is no reason to limit
the number of groups protected thereunder, how aggrieved per-
sons form themselves into groups should present no problems
to a court.
This Article also discusses the level of constitutional pro-
tection which should be granted to black women, a group which
can claim membership in two groups-blacks and women, each
of which has been viewed differently by the Court. It argues
that, whether viewed as a subset of the black group, or as a
distinct group in itself, black women are entitled to the "strict
scrutiny" level of constitutional protection. Although the sub-
set argument might well be the stronger one, due to the clarity
of the Court's recognition of race as a particularly unjustifiable
mode of classification, this Article maintains that black women
also have a strong argument that they are a "discrete and insu-
lar" minority, that they are the object of historical prejudice and
stereotypes, and that this prejudice and insularity affect their
ability to use the political processes to protect their interests.
From the colonial period to the present, various state and pri-
vate actors have singled them out for treatment different than
that meted out to white women or black men. This has resulted
in the creation of a group which is overrepresented among those
living in poverty, and underrepresented among those who influ-
ence the political process. It is a group which carries the de-
graded statuses of both blacks and women, and finds its life
chances thereby doubly limited. Any state action which burdens
this group should be subject to at least strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause. This Article suggests that because
black women are stigmatized by race plus another stigma (sex),
they should be entitled to a strict scrutiny level of review (race)
plus additional protection in the form of, for example, an eased
burden of proof.
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The Constitution was never intended by its framers to pro-
vide protection to black Americans or women Americans. 143
Certainly there was no intention of protecting black women.
Only since the passage of the fourteenth amendment, with its
statement that all citizens are entitled to the equal protection of
the laws, has the Constitution afforded such protection. Black
women clearly have not been granted the "equal protection of
the laws" in the past. It is only by demanding the highest level
scrutiny from the courts that they will receive such protection
in the future.
A Personal Postscript on Rights
This paper is situated squarely in a "rights" theory, that is,
it seeks to protect a specific group from the ravages of racism
and sexism by developing a new way of protecting their rights
in the courts. As such, it flies in the face of the new criticism
of rights consciousness and rights claims, which views such
discourse as an obstacle to political development. Rights dis-
course is considered an impediment because of the indetermi-
nate nature of rights claims' 44 and because of the way in which
it emphasizes individual rather than group rights.145 In addition,
the focus on rights can keep people passive, acquiescing in what
the state determines to grant them as "rights. ' 146 While there is
much of value in these analyses of rights, 47 we, the dispos-
sessed, cling to the assertion of rights as our only source of
113 See Justice Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Con-
stitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1987).
"I See, e.g., Olson, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63
Tex. L. Rev. 387, 393 (1984); Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1417, 1418
(1984).
145 See, e.g., Dalton, Book Review (reviewing The Politics of Law, D. Kairys, ed.
1982), 6 Harv. Women's L.J. 229, 235 (1983).
146 See, e.g., Gabel and Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U Rev. L. & Soc. Change 369, 375 (1982).
147 There is much in Critical Legal Studies [hereinafter CLS] arguments which
resonates in me, though I think we arrive at similar truths through dissimilar paths. In
my first year of teaching law school, I first heard of CLS from white students, who,
after hearing my thoughts about the law, came after class to ask me ifI were a "CLS'er."
Their sense was that anyone with such a strong sense of how the law is used by the
powerful to control the weak and the resources, had to be a CLS'er. What I always
wanted to answer, but never did, was "No, I'm just black. And this is how black people
have always understood the law." Black students, of course, never asked that question.
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protection in an overwhelmingly racist and sexist society. 48 It
is not that we believe that the law is good and just and will save
us. Far from it. Rather, we believe that the law, and claims to
rights under the law, are all that we have, all that stand between
us and even greater oppression. As Pat Williams so eloquently
stated: "To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true;
yet it is also true that blacks believed in them so much and so
hard that we gave them life where there was none before. '149
Not only have we held on to rights claims as our only hope in
a hostile and legalistic world, but we have won some of these
claims. 150 These victories give us a sense of empowerment and
the energy to face yet another day of onslaught, struggle, victory
and defeat. Every successful step makes the thought of the next
step possible.
Elizabeth Schneider explores this theme in her dialectic
analysis of rights and politics in the development of social move-
ments. 151 In her view, rights discourse and political experience
interact in a manner which shapes the development of the po-
litical process. 52 Schneider further explores the positive aspects
of rights discourse in political movements, including the devel-
opment of a sense of group identity and pride, and the devel-
opment of a means whereby the individual can become part of
the group, and then link the group to the broader society. 53 As
she states, linking one's own experience with the "universal
claim of rights" can be a "radical and transforming notion.' ' 54
148 See, e.g., Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have
What Minorities Want?, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 301, 306-07 (1987); Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, id. at 340-41; Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, id. at 413, 416.
149 Williams, supra note 148, at 430; see also Matsuda, supra note 148, at 338.
11o The fact that our victories are always partial victories-half-steps, side-steps,
steps often in unexpected directions--does not mean that pressing the claim did not
serve our ultimate aims. I have heard some decry the Brown decision, for example,
because of the subsequent resegregation of so many school districts, and because of
the difficulties in showing what benefits are accruing to black children. They forget, I
think, both the powerful, symbolic effect of that decision in and of itself; and that the
Brown decision spawned a whole set of decisions striking down "separate-but-equal"
public accommodations. Though this might seem trivial to a northern white American,
no black person who has had to live by those signs in the South would fail to see their
removal as a victory, and a step towards empowerment.
"I The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 (1986).
112 Id. at 590.
'51 Id. at 627.
"14 Id. at 629.
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Williams also articulates a positive aspect of rights dis-
course by pointing out how empowering it can be to claim one's
rights, to claim, that is, the place one is entitled to in the society.
"'Rights' feels so new in the mouths of most black people. It is
still so deliciously empowering to say. It is a sign for and a gift
of selfhood .... It is the magic wand of visibility and invisi-
bility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power and no-power." 155
It is within this framework of rights discourse--one of self-
definition and empowerment-that I wish to situate this work.
And I want to discuss how the assertion of my rights claims-
as a black woman with a keen interest in her rights under the
Constitution-has been personally "radical and transforming."
I, like many other black women, have often felt torn be-
tween two distinct and often warring social movements: the
black movement and the women's movement. In each of them,
I could reflect and act upon one aspect of my self, and in each
of them, I was one of a member of the (relatively) powerless
outsider group. 56 1 had the sense of being fragmented, of being
split into two entities with often competing goals.1 57 Certainly
during the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, black
women who expressed a concern about women's rights were
considered traitors to the race.158
Thinking about and writing about the constitutional rights
of black women has allowed me to pull those fragments of self
,15 Williams, supra note 148, at 431.
6 See, e.g., J. Jordan, Civil Wars 118 (1981). ("And why does it continue to be
the case that, when our ostensible leadership talks about the 'liberation of the Black
man' that is precisely, and only, what they mean?"); and L. Clifton, Good Woman:
Poems and a Memoir 1969-1980, at 122 (1987), in a poem entitled "To Ms. Ann":
I will have to forget
your face
when you watched me breaking
in the fields,
missing my children.
atd you never called me sister
then, you never called me sister
and it has only been forever and
I will have to forget your face.
'"7Cf. N. Shange, For Colored Girls Who Have Considered Suicide/When the
Rainbow Is Enuf 45 (1975). ("but bein' alive & bein' a woman & bein' colored is a
metaphysical dilemma/I haven't conquered yet").
158 See Marable, supra note 105, at 83-99.
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back into a whole, focused and centered. And one works more
strongly and clearly from a centered self. 59 Another empower-
ing act has been to take charge of defining my group, of naming
myself. Naming oneself, defining oneself and thereby taking the
power to define out of the hands of those who wield that power
over you, is an important act of empowerment. 160 The "first
power of the weak" is the "refusal to accept the definition of
oneself that is put forth by the powerful.' 161 Defining a group of
black women who see themselves with group rights under the
Constitution is staking a claim to whatever those with privilege
are entitled. The act of self-definfition thus makes clear our worth
and entitlement, and sets forth our view of ourselves as one
which will have to be reckoned with.
Self-definition is intimately linked with empowerment. Em-
powerment, or claims to power, I must admit, are not easy to
make. They are, in fact, ffightening to make, for I live, like
every other black woman law professor, in a world where the
silences about black women in the legal literature and in the
classrooms are so loud as to be deafening, and in a world where
119 See Lorde, supra note 126, at 120-21:
My fullest concentration of energy is available to me only when I integrate all
the parts of who I am, openly, allowing power from particular sources of my
living to flow back and forth freely through all my different selves, without the
restrictions of externally imposed definition. Only then can I bring myself and
my energies as a whole to the service of those struggles which I embrace as
part of my living.
160 Cf. M. Cliff, Claiming an Identity They Taught Me to Despise 8 (1980). ("I am
untangling the filaments of my history .... The question of my identity is partly a
question of color: of my right to name myself."). Lewis Carroll captured this connection
between the power to define and the power to control in Through the Looking Glass:
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so
many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's
all."
L. Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass 247
(1962).
161 E. Janeway, The Powers of the Weak 167 (1980). Of course, once one has refused
to believe in and accept the way the powerful categorize black women, it is an easy
next step to refuse to believe the content the powerful pour into the name "black
women."
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those in power will determine my career based upon their as-
sessment of what I write. How can it be "worthwhile scholar-
ship" to write about black women? If it were "important," surely
a white man would have written about it long ago! And would
not a black female law professor-herself of clearly low status-
be seen as more "professional" if she wrote about "important"
issues, such as tax or corporations, 62 or the burden of proof in
age discrimination cases. But again, by connecting rights dis-
course back to empowerment and community, I was able to find
a community which empowered me to write and to assert my
rights... a community of historians, poets, essayists, scholars.
Audre Lorde, for one, yielded no ground. She said: "I am
myself-a Black woman warrior poet doing my work-come to
ask you, are you doing yours?"' 63 She sympathized: "Of course
I am afraid, because the transformation of silence into language
and action is an act of self-revelation, and that always seems
fraught with danger. [But] ... the machine will try to grind you
into dust anyway, whether or not we speak."' 64 And finally, she
urged:
We can learn to work and speak when we are afraid in
the same way we have learned to work and speak when
we are tired. For we have been socialized to respect
fear more than our own needs for language and defi-
nition, and while we wait in silence for that final luxury
of earlessness, the weight of that silence will choke
us. 
165
Writing about rights for black women has put me in touch
again with issues of self-definition, empowerment, staking my
claim in the larger community, and creating and working within
a community of support. Like Alice Walker, I too "write all the
things I should have been able to read."'' 66
162 It is always clear to me that by writing, teaching, or thinking about the bottom,
one is always writing, teaching, or thinking about the top. I am not sure it is always
clear to others.
163 Lorde, supra note 126, at 41-42.
'K Id. at 41-42.
61 Id. at 44.
166 A. Walker, In Search of Our Mothers' Garden 13 (1983).
